Vancouver ICBC Car Accident Injury Lawyers 604-602-9000
Vancouver ICBC car accident injury victim lawyers seek the highest possible fair damage settlements for their clients. On the other hand ICBC car accident injury defence lawyers seek to nullify or reduce any ICBC accident damage injury awards. Unfortunately for innocent car crash victims, Vancouver ICBC car accident injury adjustors and Vancouver ICBC car accident injury defence lawyers are highly skeptical of innocent drivers or passengers who make a Vancouver personal injury claim.
This is sadly true even though many injured drivers have been faithfully paying their ICBC car insurance for many years. ICBC is even using your insurance premiums lately to advertise their program to stamp out ICBC claim fraud. Our highly skilled Vancouver ICBC car accident injury lawyers know injured car accident victims just want to get on with their lives and not be stonewalled or stalled in getting a fair settlement and moving forward as best they can after being the innocent victim of an ICBC car accident injury. Meet with us so we can assess your claim for free. In many cases, you will be shocked how it compares to an ICBC offer.
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ICBC Defence Approach Criticized By Judge In Vancouver ICBC Car Accident Injury
Recently a trial judge in Woelders v. Gaudette, 2016 BCSC 1066 criticized ICBC’s defence approach in a Vancouver ICBC Car Accident Injury case and the court awarded nearly $340,000 in damages for an injury the defence said was not related to a car crash the victim suffered:
 The recent jurisprudence of the Court of Appeal has affirmed that the plaintiff must demonstrate both an impairment to his or her earning capacity and that there is a real and substantial possibility that the diminishment in earning capacity will result in a pecuniary loss. If the plaintiff discharges that requirement, he or she may prove the quantification of that loss of earning capacity either on an earnings approach or a “capital asset” approach: Perren v. Lalari, 2010 BCCA 140 at para. 32. Regardless of the approach, the court must endeavour to quantify the financial harm accruing to the plaintiff over the course of his or her working career: Pett v. Pett, 2009 BCCA 232 at para. 19; X. v. Y at para. 183.  Evidence of ongoing pain may be sufficient to ground a substantial possibility that a plaintiff’s pain will adversely affect his or her future ability to work. This may hold true even where, at the time of trial, the plaintiff has not missed work due to the injury: Clark v. Kouba, 2014 BCCA 50 at para. 33; see generally, Williamson v. Suna, 2009 BCSC 576 at paras. 52, 55 and 62.
 In a nutshell, my task is to compare the likely future of Ms. Woelders’ working life if the Accident had not happened, to her likely future working life in light of its occurrence: Gregory v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, 2011 BCCA 144 [Gregory] at para. 32. The defendant asserts that Ms. Woelders has failed to prove a real and substantial possibility of a future event leading to an income loss and that consequently, she is not entitled to an award under this head.  My observation is that in recent years defendants in personal injury actions before this Court have increasingly adopted this submission, namely that the plaintiff’s future loss of earning capacity claim falters on the failure to meet the threshold of a real and substantial possibility that the injury will result in a future pecuniary loss. In my experience, this tends to be the position taken by the defence even in cases where that is plainly not so or where there is a reasonable prospect that the Court will find the evidence goes the other way. This practice is of concern, given that such a blanket assertion ordinarily comprises the full extent of the defendant’s argument on this factually nuanced and conceptually difficult issue. Where the Court determines that the plaintiff has indeed made out a future loss claim, it is left with no argument of substance from the defendant as to the negative or positive contingencies at play or the quantum of damages to be assessed under this head.
 I would suggest that a more constructive approach would be for defence counsel who contend that the plaintiff has not satisfied the requisite evidentiary test, to make submissions in the alternative about the relative contingencies and the quantum of the plaintiff’s future loss of earning capacity. Adherence to that advocacy practice will ensure that the Court has the benefit of considered submissions on the issue from all parties.
 On the evidence, the defendant’s position that Ms. Woelders has fallen short of establishing a real and substantial possibility that her injuries will result in a future pecuniary loss is untenable. It is also puzzling, given the basis upon which the defendant appears to have agreed to the calculation of Ms. Woelders’ pre‑trial loss as set out in Mr. Benning’s report. Is it the defendant’s expectation that after the trial Ms. Woelders’ condition will immediately and sufficiently improve such that she will be able to forever resume teaching on a full‑time basis?
 Ms. Woelders was approaching the prime working years of her teaching career when she was injured in the Accident. Many of her compulsory work tasks and everyday activities continue to trigger and aggravate her symptoms. Those setbacks cause her pain that can become intense and functionally limiting. She tries to push through as best she can.
176] In summary, I find that Ms. Woelders is entitled to the following damages:
- $38,343 for her past loss of income-earning capacity;
- $175,000 for her future loss of income-earning capacity;
- $85,000 in non-pecuniary damages;
- $19,000 for the cost of her future care; and
- $20,929.77 in special damages.